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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Previous research has suggested that depth of search in chess does not increase much as a function 
of skill. We submitted players to a problem-solving task with complex positions. We found a strong 
skill effect in depth of search, rate of search, and number of nodes generated. At the level of strong 
masters, the absolute values of these variables were much higher than in previous studies 
(sometimes 10 times higher). Supplementary data on memory, practice, reaction times, and time-
constrained decision making (a maximum decision time of 10 seconds) indicated that players’ 
behaviour was consistent with the behaviour of players previously studied in the literature and with 
predictions of  theories based on pattern recognition. Beyond adding support to the hypothesis that 
both the ability to search and pattern recognition are relevant aspects of expert thinking, these 
results are important in showing that previous research has vastly underestimated experts’ search 
potential. We conclude that long-term memory knowledge allows both extensive search and rapid 
evaluation when making decisions under time pressure. Players adaptively use either problem-
solving method depending on the demands of the task. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The formal description of problem solving as a search through a problem space (Newell and Simon, 1972) 
raises the question as to how much of this space must be searched before reaching a decision. While computers 
must search problem spaces extensively to solve problems (Russell and Norvig, 1995), as is apparent for 
example in game playing (e.g., Berliner, 1984; van den Herik and Iida, 1998), humans carry out searches 
orders of magnitude smaller, in part due to their limited computational resources. In his theory of bounded 
rationality, Simon (1947, 1955) argued that humans choose “good enough” solutions with little search because 
the heuristics they use make their search highly selective.  
 
Independently of Simon, De Groot (1946/1978) addressed the question of bounded rationality in his seminal 
study on chessplayers’ thinking and decision making. Participants were presented with a chess position and 
were required to think aloud while pondering their next move. The surprising finding was that there were no 
differences in the macro-structure of search between grandmasters (including world champions) and candidate 
masters, although the former prevailed over the latter in terms of the quality of the chosen moves. That is, 
number of moves generated, mean depth of search, and maximal depth of search — among other variables — 
remained roughly constant across the different skill levels. By contrast, De Groot found large quantitative 
differences between strong masters and weaker players in a memory task.  
 
These results led to the development of pattern-recognition theories of expertise (e.g., chunking theory: Chase 
and Simon, 1973; template theory: Gobet and Simon, 1996a), according to which the storage of a large number 
of perceptual chunks (familiar configurations) in LTM enables fast recognition of key configurations in the 
problem at hand and thus selective search. While mostly corroborated by data on perception and memory 
(Gobet, de Voogt, and Retschitzki, 2004), these theories have also received support from investigations of 
problem solving. Gobet and Simon (1996b) found that world champion Kasparov did not decrease his 
performance substantially when playing simultaneous games, even though the reflection time was considerably 
diminished. Klein, Wolf, Militello, and Zsambok (1995) showed that, in a decision-making task, the first move 
that players generated was usually “good enough”. Burns (2004) found that performance in blitz (about 5 s per 
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move, on average) shares 81% of the variance with the ratings based on standard chess (about 180 s per move, 
on average). He also suggested that, as players’ skill increases, proportionally more of that skill is based on fast 
processes such as pattern recognition than on slow processes such as search. Finally, Charness, Reingold, 
Pomplun and Stampe (2001) showed a skill effect (candidate masters better than intermediate players) in a 
simple problem-solving task, both in accuracy and speed of response. 
 
Holding (1985) criticized the pattern-recognition approach, suggesting that search and evaluation, rather than 
pattern recognition, are the key processes of expert performance. This opposition was misguided, as pattern 
recognition and search are not mutually exclusive in pattern-recognition theories, but complementary (Chase 
and Simon, 1973; Gobet and Simon, 1998). Search is enabled by the recursive application of pattern-
recognition processes in the mind’s eye. Once a pattern is recognized and a move generated, the image in the 
mind’s eye incorporates this change, and pattern recognition takes place over the new image. This idea is 
implemented in SEARCH (Gobet, 1997), a formal model that combines pattern recognition, search, and mental 
imagery. Simulations with SEARCH showed that the interaction of recognition and search leads to an increase 
in depth of search as a function of skill. Indeed, this prediction is similar to Holding’s (1985), who argued that 
search should increase almost linearly with expertise. Both predictions can be contrasted with Charness’s 
(1981), who proposed that depth of search reaches a plateau after candidate master level. 
 
On the whole, replications of De Groot’s experiment have supported Holding’s prediction only weakly. 
Charness (1981) submitted players ranging from 1284 to 2004 Elo, to four different positions. He found that 
the quality of moves was a function of skill and that there were slight but statistically significant skill 
differences in depth of search. There was also a skill effect in total moves analyzed, number of episodes, and 
number of branches. However, no effect was found in rate of search. Gobet (1998) reused De Groot’s position 
A with players ranging from 1600 to 2450 Elo. The quality of moves and mean depth varied across levels of 
expertise; however, the differences were rather low and no effect was found in maximal depth of search. He 
also found that masters searched faster than candidate masters2. Saariluoma (1990) examined players from 
1900 to 2500 Elo and found that international masters sometimes searched less deeply than master players. 
Finally, Chabris and Hearst (2003) found that top-level grandmasters made fewer blunders (5.02 per 1,000 
moves) in standard chess than in rapid chess (6.85). In rapid chess, about 30 s are allotted per move, on 
average. 
 
Thus, although both pattern-recognition and search theories predict a positive skill effect with search variables, 
previous studies found no skill effect, only a small effect, or even a negative effect. The lack of clear skill 
differences in absolute or relative terms is even more surprising given that some grandmasters report searching 
at great depths in competitive games (e.g., Shirov, 1997). A possible explanation for this paradox resides in 
variations in task difficulty (Saariluoma, 1995) and in the fact that researchers have used positions whose 
solution does not require extensive search. For example, based on the solution provided by De Groot (1978), 
his position A can be solved by visiting only 17 nodes3, with a maximal depth of 9 ply.   
 
Here, we present new data showing that, consistent with Holding’s claim (1985), chessmasters’ search 
potential had been underestimated for almost fifty years. We followed De Groot’s (1978) methodology but 
selected complex positions whose unique solution required extensive search. We seconded these results with 
data on fast decision making, memory, and practice. This allowed us to ascertain that our players did not differ 
from players previously studied and that their skill (partly) depends on pattern recognition. Given that we 
expected large differences between individuals of various skill levels in our study, we used only four 
participants (using a small number of participants has a long tradition in expertise research; e.g., Chase and 
Simon, 1973; Wagner and Scurrah, 1971). 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Elo (1978) developed the rating scale that is now used by the World Chess Federation (FIDE). The scale has a normal 
distribution and a standard deviation of 200 points. The best player of the world has around 2800 points and the weakest 
1200. In the psychology literature, players between 1600 and 1800 are called Class B, between 1800 and 2000 Class A, 
between 2000 and 2200 experts, and players with more than 2200 are considered masters. FIDE awards players with titles 
for their performances in specific tournaments. As an approximation, players above 2300, 2400 and 2500 are called FIDE 
masters, international masters, and international grandmasters, respectively. In this article, we use “candidate master” 
instead of  “expert” to avoid confusion with the general meaning of the term “expert”. 
3 A node is one position in the search tree (either that produced in a think-aloud protocol or that generated by analysis). 
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2. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Below we discuss our research method by describing the participants (2.1), the materials (2.2), and the 
procedure (2.3). 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
One international grandmaster (GM) with 2550 Elo points (age 21), one international master (IM, 2500, age 
22), one candidate master (CM, 2100, age 19), and one class B player (CB, 1750, age 19) participated in our 
study.  
 
2.2 Materials 
 
The three positions used (see Figure 1) were complex, requiring considerable look-ahead search and 
evaluation. Position A was De Groot’s (1978) position C. He presented a possible solution requiring 52 nodes, 
with a maximal depth of 23 ply4. The second position required at least 60 nodes, with a maximal depth of 25 
ply (Roycroft, 1972, #188). The third position required at least 70 nodes, with a maximal depth of 35 ply, to be 
solved (Nunn, 1999, #3). We did not use De Groot’s position A, as it is now widely available in the chess 
literature, making it likely that our players had already seen it. The main criterion for choosing the positions 
was that their solution required deep search. This was essential for our study because the lack of a strong 
relationship between chess skill and depth of search in previous studies might have been caused by the use of 
positions that did not require deep search. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Black moves. B. White moves and wins.  C. White moves and wins. 
 
Figure 1. Positions used in the thinking-aloud task (Experiment 1). Position (a) was used by De Groot (1978), 
position (b) is a problem created by Kasparyan (Roycroft, 1972, #188), and position (c) was obtained from 
Nunn (1999). 
 
For the three positions, the main lines are as follows. Position A: De Groot proposes that Black can free 
himself by 1. …e5 2. Bxc8 Raxc8! 3. dxe5 Qe4! 4. Rhe1 Qxe2 5. Rxe2 Ng4! 6. exd6 Rxf3, with both 7. dxc7 
and 7. d7 failing to give an advantage to White. However, FRITZ finds that 7. Na7! gives White an edge 
(Merim Bilalić, personal communication). Position B: The main line is 1. Bg5 b3 2. Rd2+ Ka1 3. f7 Rxg5 4. 
f8=Q Rg1+ 5. Rd1 Rg2 6. Qa3+ Ra2 7. Rd2 Rxa3 8. Rb2 Ra2 9. Rb1 mate. Position C: The game 
Polugaevsky-Torre (London, 1984) continued by 1. Bxh7+ Kxh7 2. Qh5+ Kg8 3. Rg3 g6 4. Rxg6+ fxg6 5. 
Qxg6+ Kh8 6. Qh6+ Kg8 7. Qxe6+ Kh8 8. Qh6+ Kg8 9. Qg6+ Kh8 10. Qh5+ Kg8 11. Bh6 Bf8 12. Qg6+ Kh8 
13. Bxf8 Rxf8 14. Qh6+ Kg8 15. Ra3 1-0. 
 
2.3  Procedure 
 
The participants were required to put themselves in a tournament situation as if they were to move. Thirty 
minutes were allowed as maximum reflection time for each position. When the players had reached a decision, 
they had to play the chosen move. Following De Groot’s instructions, players were required to say aloud 
everything they were thinking of (e.g., moves, plans, evaluations, and even irrelevant thoughts). Positions B 
                                                          
4 A ply is the level of depth in a sequence of moves. In chess it corresponds to half a move. A move consists of two ply, one 
White and one Black. 
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and C had a unique solution requiring deep and wide search (participants were told that they had to find it). 
Concurrent think-aloud protocols were tape recorded. 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
Once the protocols were transcribed, we calculated the values of three variables: depth of search, number of 
nodes generated, and rate of search. As in previous experiments, depth of search was defined as the number of 
ply generated from the problem position until the end of one variation. This measure was further refined as 
average depth of search and maximal depth of search. Rate of search was defined as the number of nodes 
generated divided by the reflection time. Table 1 displays the average results across the three positions for each 
player.  
  
      GM IM CM CB 
      m sd m sd m sd m sd 
Quality of moves 4.3 1.1 4.7 0.6 3 1.7 3 1.4 
Total time (min) 30 0 30 0 22.5 3.4 28.9 1.5 
#nodes generated 370 101 405 44 152.7 30 88 2.8 
Rate of search (nodes/min)   12.3 4.1 13.5 1.7 6.8 1.2 3.2 0.2 
Max. depth (in ply) 25 12.2 23.7 5.1 17.7 4.9 10.5 2.2 
Mean depth (in ply) 13.8 7.4 10.5 5.0 7.4 2.8 2.8 0.2 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of variables obtained from thinking aloud protocols. 
For each player, the data are averaged access to all positions. 
 
3.1 Depth of search 
  
In all measures of depth there was a strong linear relation with chess rating (see Figure 2, top left and top 
right). Regression equations were calculated for mean and maximal depth of search (for each player, results 
were averaged across the three positions), using chess rating as a predictor. With mean depth, the regression 
line was:  mean depth = -18.3 + 0.012 * Elo (r(4) = .97, p < 0.02, one-tailed). Mean depth of search thus 
increases 2.4 ply for each standard deviation of chess skill (200 Elo points), which is larger than the 0.5 and 0.6 
ply obtained by Charness (1981) and Gobet (1998), respectively. With maximal depth of search, the equation 
was: maximal depth = -19.9 + 0.018* Elo (r (4) = .99, p < .002, one-tailed). The increase per standard 
deviation was 3.6 ply, which is higher than the 1.5 ply found in Charness (1981); Gobet (1998) did not find 
skill differences in this variable.  
 
Remarkably, the absolute values of the stronger players were more than twice those of players of the same 
level in previous studies. The mean depth of the top players in De Groot (1978), Saariluoma (1990) and Gobet 
(1998) was 5.4, 3.6 and 5 ply respectively, whereas in our study, GM and IM’s mean depth were 13.8 and 10.5 
ply, respectively. Similarly, maximal depth for the top category was 6.8 and 9.1 ply in De Groot’s and Gobet’s 
studies, respectively (no maximal depth was calculated in Saariluoma, 1990), whereas GM and IM’s maximal 
depth was 25 and 23.7 ply, respectively. 
 
3.2 Rate of search 
 
There was a strong skill effect in rate of search (see Figure 2, bottom left). GM generated 12.3 nodes per 
minute; IM 13.5; CM 6.8; and CB 3.2. Predicting rate of search from chess rating yields the following 
equation: Rate of search =  -19.2 + Elo*0.013 (r (4) = .98, p < .01, one-tailed), which corresponds to an 
increase of 2.6 nodes per minute per Elo standard deviation. The absolute values obtained at the stronger level 
for rate of search were three times higher than those found in previous studies (De Groot’s (1978) and Gobet’s 
(1998) top players searched at a rate of 3.6 and 4.8 nodes per minute, respectively). However, Wagner and 
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Scurrah (1971) reported data of a candidate master (incidentally, the authors wrongly indicated that the player 
was class C) searching at an average of 10 nodes per minute in five different positions, which is a higher value 
than that of our candidate master. 
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Figure 2: Top left: Maximal depth (in ply). Top right: mean depth (in ply). Bottom left: rate of search (nodes 
per minute). Bottom right: number of nodes generated, as a function of chess rating (Experiment 1). The data 
of the three positions are presented (because of a technical problem, CB’s data on position C were lost). CBs 
data points correspond to 1750 in the x-axis, CM’s to 2100, IM’s to 2500, and GM’s to 2550. 
 
3.3 Number of nodes generated 
  
A statistically significant linear relation between number of nodes generated and chess skill was found (GM 
370 nodes; IM 405; CM 153; and CB 88; see Figure 2, bottom right). Using Elo to predict the number of nodes 
generated yields the following formula. Number of nodes generated = -645 + Elo*0.4 (r (4) = .96, p < .02, one-
tailed), which corresponds to an increase of 80 nodes per Elo standard deviation. At the level of strong masters, 
the absolute values presented here (an average of 387.5 nodes) are ten times higher than those found in De 
Groot’s, Gobet’s and Saariluoma’s studies, where top players generated only 35, 58 and 23 nodes, respectively 
(an average of 38.6 nodes). Wagner and Scurrah’s (1971) candidate master generated an average of 172 nodes; 
this is similar to the 153 nodes generated by our candidate master. 
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4. QUALITATIVE FEATURES OF THE PROTOCOLS 
  
In his influential book written for the chess community, Kotov (1971) suggested that grandmasters are better 
than weaker players because they know how to calculate variations and are more disciplined in their thinking. 
Based on this observation, he proposed a method for helping players to carry out search more efficiently. The 
first step is to decide which moves are worth considering (candidate moves). Once this is done, the player has 
to analyze each move until an evaluation of the position can be produced, without repeating the analysis of a 
given variation or “jumping” from one branch of the search tree to another. Thus, a new candidate move can be 
analyzed only when the analysis of the previous candidate move is completed. Interestingly, this is not what De 
Groot (1946) found: all the players he studied, including the grandmasters, tended to reinvestigate the same 
variation several times, either immediately or after the consideration of a different variation, a phenomenon he 
called “progressive deepening”. Given the discrepancy between Kotov’s advice and De Groot’s data, it is of 
interest to look at this aspect of the search behaviour in our sample (see also Gobet and Jansen, in press, for a 
further discussion of this question). 
 
The protocols indicate that CM and CB did not generate a list of candidate moves and “jumped” from one 
move to another. Surprisingly, GM also jumped between moves; however, there were two differences between 
his search behaviour and that of the intermediate players. First, GM generated a list of candidate moves that 
was enlarged when a new idea, for which a new candidate move was necessary, occurred to him. Second, he 
was aware that he was analyzing without discipline and tried to compose himself while he was performing the 
task. Finally, IM showed a “textbook” behaviour: he generated a list of candidate moves which he modified 
very rarely, and tended to analyze systematically each move until he had reached an evaluation. In sum, there 
were clear differences between the masters and the intermediate players in the knowledge of how chess 
trainers, such as Kotov, recommend analysis of variations to be conducted and in the actual search behaviour. 
It may be worth noting that both IM and GM had read Kotov’s book. These results suggest that search 
behaviour is not restricted to progressive deepening but can be under strategic control. 
 
 
5. ADDITIONAL DATA  
 
Before discussing the theoretical impact of our results, we need to make sure that our players are representative 
of those used in previous studies. For this purpose, we briefly report data collected with them on rapid decision 
making, memory, and practice. If the skill effects observed in search behaviour remain in these tasks, the 
hypothesis of compatibility between pattern recognition and ability to search deeply would be supported.  
 
The fast-decision experiment imposed drastic constraints on thinking time, so that players were able to perform 
only limited search and presumably had to rely more on pattern recognition. Forty-nine positions of medium 
complexity were selected from Livshitz (1988); they required 10.4 nodes (sd = 4.2) on average to be solved, 
with a depth of search of 6.4 ply (sd = 1.6). Each position was presented on a computer screen for 5 s, followed 
by a 5 s black screen. Within this 10-second period, participants had to verbalize their move. A clear skill 
effect was found: GM correctly solved 23 problems (46.9%), IM 18 (36.9%), CM 4 (8.2%), and  CB 2 (4.1%). 
The correlation between Elo rating and the accuracy in the task was significant (r (4) = .94; p < .03, one-tailed).  
 
To control for the possibility that these results were due to differences in domain-general perceptual abilities, 
we asked participants to carry out a simple reaction-time task. A red or a yellow circle was presented on the 
screen, and participants had to press the relevant button as fast and accurately as possible. No skill differences 
were found: GM’s mean was 339 ms, with a standard deviation of (±) 70 ms; IM, 369 ms ± 66 ms; CM, 357 
ms ± 61 ms; and CB, 343 ms ± 75 ms.  
 
If the skill effect observed in problem-solving tasks can be accounted for by domain-specific LTM patterns, as 
proposed by Chase and Simon, then there should also be a skill effect in a memory task requiring the use of 
these patterns. To test this hypothesis, we submitted our participants to De Groot’s (1978) recall task, which 
has been previously used in numerous studies (see Saariluoma, 1995, or Gobet et al., 2004).  We used three 
types of positions: game, random, and shape (this condition consisted in showing shapes instead of chess 
pieces). The positions were displayed on a computer screen for 5 s. We found a strong skill effect in the game 
condition (83.2%, 85%, 54%, and 47%, for GM, IM, CM, and CB, respectively), a small effect in the random 
condition (21.7%, 19%, 17.7%, and 15.5%) and no differences in the shape condition (15.9%, 15.5%, 15%, 
and 15%). These results are consistent with previous data (see Gobet and Simon, 1996c).  
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Since Chase and Simon (1973) hypothesized that domain-specific patterns are acquired by practice, we asked 
our participants to fill in a grid stating how many hours per week they spent either studying or practicing chess 
in each year of their chess career (see Charness, Krampe and Mayr, 1996, for a similar approach). With this 
information we calculated the cumulative time spent studying and playing chess. Consistent with the literature, 
the results showed a strong skill effect. For studying, the cumulative hours spent by GM, IM, CM and CB 
were: 6890, 7904, 1872, and 416 hours, respectively; for playing: 7722, 7072, 2704, and 1326 hours, 
respectively.  
 
 
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, we submitted players of various skill levels to complex chess positions. Contrary to De Groot’s 
(1978) results, a clear skill effect was found in the three search variables investigated. We also found a skill 
effect when players had to solve problems under extreme time constraints. In addition, consistent with the 
literature, the strong players of our study (IM and GM) performed better than the intermediate players (CM and 
CB) in a memory task with briefly presented chess positions and spent more time practising their skill, but  did 
not show evidence of general skills in a reaction-time task.  
 
While Charness (1981) and Gobet (1998) did find small skill effects in depth of search, the novelty of our 
study is that it shows a linear relation between depth of search and Elo rating, from class B to grandmaster. The 
absolute values at the level of strong masters were from two to ten times higher than those reported in the 
literature. These results are inconsistent with Charness’s hypothesis that search reaches an asymptote when 
players become masters, but support Holding’s (1985) hypothesis that it increases almost linearly with skill. 
They are also consistent with SEARCH’s (Gobet, 1997, Figure 3) predictions that search on average increases 
as a power function of skill, although the rate of increase is much higher than that proposed by SEARCH.  
 
These results support our hypothesis that positions requiring large trees of moves to be solved lead to 
substantial skill differences in search behaviour. Our results are important because they correct a widespread 
underestimation in the psychological literature of the search capabilities of chess professionals. An interesting 
question for further research is whether this result generalizes to other domains of expertise.  
 
While able to search deep in our think-aloud experiment, our players behaved as predicted by pattern-
recognition theories in the memory and fast-decision tasks. Remarkably, in the second task, GM and IM were 
able to solve one half and one third of the problems, respectively, although the decision had to be reached 
within 10 seconds. How can these results be reconciled? Pattern-recognition theories predict skill differences 
in search variables when the position requires deep and wide search (as we found in our study), but not when 
the position can be solved via pattern recognition without extensive search. In this study, we avoided the 
circularity that this reasoning may suggest by reporting the number of nodes and ply required to solve 
positions, based on published sources. 
 
We acknowledge some weaknesses of our study. The size of our sample is not large enough to make precise 
quantitative estimates of the search variables under study. Although the results of the fast-decision task make 
us reasonably confident that IM and GM can solve problems of medium difficulty without extensive search, we 
did not use a relatively simple position (such as De Groot’s position A) with the think-aloud task. Furthermore, 
with our positions B and C, we encouraged our participants to find a unique solution, which is an addition to 
De Groot’s instructions. This may have affected search behaviour, beyond the characteristics of the positions 
used. While we believe that these shortcomings do not invalidate our main result — that previous literature has 
vastly underestimated chess experts’ search abilities — we agree that they obscure the conditions requiring 
more exhaustive or more selective search. Further research is required to clarify these conditions. 
 
We conclude that Holding (1985) was right in claiming that chessmasters (and presumably other experts) can 
sometimes carry out extensive search. However, De Groot (1978) and Chase and Simon (1973) were also 
correct in highlighting the importance of selective search and the role of pattern recognition. The strength of 
pattern-recognition theories, which propose that pattern recognition is an important part of look-ahead search, 
is that they provide mechanisms for both rapid and slow decision making (Saariluoma, 1995; Gobet, 1997; 
Gobet and Simon, 1998). In contrast, search theories (e.g., Holding, 1985), while supported by the results of 
our think-aloud experiment, fail to explain how skill effects remain when there is almost no opportunity for 
search. 
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